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Abstract:
This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and economic growth in Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa; collectively known as the BRICS. Given the rapid rise of the BRICS
and the international spotlight placed on them, this research study aims to explore the effect
corruption has on the GDP growth of the states. To do this, a time-series analysis is conducted on
each of the five states in order to analyze corruption’s effect on the individual countries. It is found
that corruption only holds significance in Brazil and Russia, however, whilst there appears to be
an inverse relationship between corruption and growth in Brazil, there is a positive correlation
between the two in Russia.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the relationship between corruption and economic growth to
determine the effect of corruption on the growth of a state. As such, a time series analysis will be
done using OLS regression for each of the five (5) states chosen for the purposes of this study.
These states are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, collectively known as the BRICS.
The study will focus on the 25 year period between 1990 and 2014.
Corruption, as defined in Appendix B, is generally accepted to be a deterrent of economic
growth and development. For the purposes of this study, corruption acts as the independent
variable of interest. Literature, some of which will be reviewed in Section 2 of this paper, on the
subject has greatly documented how corruption deters, or hinders, factors including (but not
limited to) foreign direct investment (FDI), productivity and participation (economic and
political), therefore obstructing economic progress. Given the recent and rapid upturn of the
BRICS’s economies in the past decades, as well as the expected positive development of these
states, this study has chosen to focus on these specific states in order to see how corruption (a
phenomenon arguably rampant in some of these states) has affected the economies thus far, and
to conclude on whether or not it has had any sort of impact on the expanding economies of each
state.
The BRICS are a collection of the five aforementioned states. They are emerging
economies characterized as developing or newly industrialized states known to have rapidly
growing economies and large amounts of political influence in regional, or global, affairs. The
group was formally known as BRICs until South Africa was recognized as part of the group. The
group have held five formal summits since 2010, with the leader of each state present, and
discuss policies of structural, economic and political change.
This paper differs from other literature exploring the relationship between corruption and
economic growth in the observation period which the analysis will be conducted on as well as the
units of observation, the BRICS states. This will help generate policy suggestions for each state,
possibly helping them identify policies moving forward that will help not only their political
atmosphere but their economies as well. This is crucial especially given current events in countries

such as Brazil, China and South Africa where on-going fights against corruption have intensified
and have even called for impeachment of high-level officials.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives information about the general
trend on the topic at hand whilst section 3 gives a brief literature review. Section 4 explains the
data collection and empirical methodology. Section 5 presents and interprets the empirical results.
Finally, a conclusion is offered in section 6.

2.0 TREND (OF THE GIVEN TOPIC)
Figure 1.0 – Graph Showing Control of Corruption Evolution by Region

Figure 1.0 shows the general trend of Control of Corruption by region over the years.As
it can be seen, there has been a general improvement in Control of Corruption over the years.
Although there are some turbulent years, for instance 2002 to 2006 in the Former Soviet Union,
many of the world regions have experienced an increase in Control of Corruption since 1996.
Figure 1.0 also shows that whilst the Former Soviet Union ranks the lowest in this indicator,
Western Europe/North America is ranked the highest. It must be noted that some of the regions
represented by the BRICS are not represented in the diagram.

Figure 2.0 – Graph Showing Relationship between Corruption and GDP per Capita

Source: Penn World Tables and World Bank Group, World Development Indicators, 2015
Figure 2.0 shows the inverse nature of the relationship between corruption and GDP per
Capita. From the graph, it can be seen that countries with low levels of corruption, such as
Luxembourg, have a higher GDP per capita than countries with high levels of corruption, for
example Liberia, who has a significantly lower GDP per capita. Looking specifically at the
positioning of our BRIC states on the graph, the trend prevails. South Africa is listed to be at the
-0.5 level of corruption with approximately US$9,000 in per capita GDP, Brazil measured to
have corruption level of 0 is also in the US$9,000 GDP per capita range, but slightly lower than
the per capita GDP of South Africa. China and India are both listed to have a corruption levels of
0.5 and GDPs per capita in the US$4,000 range, showing that higher levels of corruption are
associated with lower levels of GDP per capita. Russia, however, appears to be an outlier as,
with a corruption level of 0.9, the state’s GDP per capita is relatively high at US$10,000.

Figure 3.0 – Graph Showing Relationship between Economic Growth and
Corruption Index

Source: Latin American Journal of Economics
Figure 3.0 illustrates the relationship between economic growth and corruption, showing
that the relationship, contrary to Figure 2.0, appears to be quadratic in nature.The graph aims to
show that the less corrupt a country is, the greater the growth rate, however, beyond a certain
threshold, the graph appears to show less corruption is associated with reduced growth. This
trend is consistent with some of the literature that will be presented in Section 3.0.

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
Mauro (1995) explores the relations between corruption and growth by using a crosssectional data set. In the study, corruption indicators such as judicial system efficiency, measures
of political stability (such as institutional change, terrorism, relationship with neighbor states),
amount of red tape corruption as well subjective corruption indicators (e.g. perception levels) in
order to measure the effect corruption has on the growth of a country. In order to avoid
multicollinearity, Mauro (1995) finds the aggregate of similar indicators and joins them in the
creation of specific variables that encompass multiple variables. For example, taking the
composite function for judiciary system and red tape creating one bureaucratic efficiency index
that measures all the variables at once. Mauro (1995) finds there to be a significant, negative
relationship between corruption and investment rate. Taking a closer look Mauro (1995) found
that there is a stronger relationship between bureaucratic efficiency and equipment investment
than bureaucratic efficiency and non-equipment investment, such as private investment. In
addition, Mauro (1995) finds that improvements in bureaucratic efficiency lead to increases in
the average GDP per capita growth rate.
The effect of corruption on investment growth is explored by (Asiedu and Freeman,
2009). This study focuses primarily on the firm-level in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa as
well as transition countries and employs six measures of corruption (two at the firm level and
four at the country level) to explore the relationship between corruption and firms’ investment
growth. Other independent variables considered included, firm size, industry, GDP growth and
inflation, amongst others. (Asiedu and Freeman, 2009) explore this relationship by collecting
data on internal (or perceived/experienced) corruption measures through surveys and
questionnaires; external corruption data from private (typically foreign) agencies which provide
risk ratings and assessments; and, hybrid corruption data which are composite indexes of
corruption data from multiple sources. (Asiedu and Freeman, 2009) conclude by finding that the
effect of corruption on investment varies with the region. That is, whilst corruption appears to
have a significant, negative impact on firms in transition countries, corruption appears to have no
significant impact on firms in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.

(Ebben and de Vaal, 2009) uses a formal growth framework to find the relationship
between corruption and economic growth. Findings of this study show that in states with poor
institutions, corruption may actually be “conducive to growth.” This is because the positive
effect corruption has on the “working of the institutional system” is greater than corruption’s
negative effect on growth. (Ebben and de Vaal, 2009) use a two layer model, the first assuming
an institutional vacuum and the second accounting for the effect institutions have on the
relationship between growth and corruption. One of the most telling findings of the study was
discovered in the second layer. It was found that, despite the positive effect corruption may have
on the growth, that beyond a certain threshold, corruption begins to have a negative effect on
growth. This results in an inverted U-shaped curve.
Similarly, Ahmad et al (2012) explores this relationship taking into consideration
“growth-enhancing and growth-reducing levels of corruption” to conclude that the relationship
can be illustrated by an inverted U-shaped curve. This study also took into account the factor of
institutional quality. This panel data analysis examined two datasets of 60 and 71 countries. In
order to avoid issues of multicollinearity, the simple averages of similar variables are composited
to create one, all-encompassing variable.
Mo (2000) finds there to be a negative relationship between corruption (primarily in the
form of political instability) and growth. The study finds that corruption lowers levels of human
capital and private investment shares. Mo (2000) analyzes a panel data set of 54 countries for the
period of 1960 and 1985, broken down to 5 year sub-periods.
Borensztein at al. (1998) does not explore the relationship between corruption and growth
but rather provides an economic growth model. In the study, Borensztein et al. look at the effect
of foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic growth concluding that FDI helps bring new
technologies into countries which spurs growth, but only if there is an availability of human
capital. This study provides a growth model that takes into consideration factors such as FDI,
initial GDP per Capita, Human Capital Stock and a composite variable that comprises of
Government Consumption, Inflation Rate and numerous corruption indicators.

4.0 DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
4.1 Data
The study uses annual data for a time series data analysis from 1990 to 2010. The data was
collected for the 5 BRICS, those are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
Data for economic indicators was obtained from the from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators. The publically available data from the WDI includes statistics from 248
countries for 1345 economic indicators for the 50 year period from 1966 to 2015. The WDI
database has been used to obtain the data needed for all variables excluding corruption.
Data for the Control of Corruption has been obtained from the World Governance
Indicators database. The WGI database is a World Bank catalogue that contains measures of
bureaucratic efficiency, such as Political Stability, Government Effectiveness and Control of
Corruption. The data is available for world countries as well as regional clusters; for instance,
high- and low-income OECD and non-OECD states, Middle-East and North Africa, Latin America
and Caribbean and so forth.
Summary statistics for the data are provided in Tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 in the Appendix
section.

4.2 Empirical Model
Following Borenzstein et al (1998) economic growth model, this study adopted the
following model:
gdp.gr = α + β₁CoC + β₂gdp.pcap - β₃infl + β₄fdi - β₅a.dpnd + β6 govt.cons + Ɛ

The model consists of six independent variables. Of the original equation, the following
adaptations have been made in accordance to some of the models presented in the studies of the
literature review; Age Dependency has been added as a measure of population, Control of
Corruption has been isolated and made to be a measurable variable. Also, Government
Consumption and Inflation have been added to the model whilst the Human Capital measure has
been removed.
Appendix A provides the acronyms, names, explanations and expected signs of the
independent variables. CoC which denotes Control of Corruption, GDP.PCAP denoting initial
GDP per Capita, INFL denoting Inflation, FDI which denotes Foreign Direct Investment,
A.DPND denoting age dependency ratio and GOVT.CONS denoting Government Consumption.
GDP.GR (GDP Growth Rate) serves as the dependent variable.
Control of Corruption was chosen as the indicator for corruption. It measures the
perceived levels of corruption (as defined in the Introduction section of this research) and is
given as an index ranging from -2.5 (high levels of corruption) to 2.5 (low levels of corruption).
The Control of Corruption indicator encompasses both petty forms of corruption as well as grand
forms. It is for this reason that the CoC indicator was picked as the measure of corruption, for the
purposes of this study. A list of the different factors included in the CoC index is included in the
Appendix (Appendix B).

This study ran an OLS regression for each of the BRICS for the given time period. A
time-series analysis was favored by this research so as to isolate the five countries in order to see
not the general effect corruption has on growth amongst the BRICS but rather, the specific effect
of corruption within each of the countries.
Results of this regression are presented and interpreted in the following section, Section
5.0.

5.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results of the regressions run are presented in Table 2.0. Both parameter estimates as well as
significance levels are displayed in the table.

The results of the regression are mixed across the five countries. However, it can be seen
that GDP per Capita is significant in four of the five states - Brazil, Russia, China and South
Africa – at the 5%, 5%, 10% and 1% significance levels, respectively. It must be noted that while
there is a positive correlation between GDP per Capita and growth in Brazil, suggesting that a
1% change in GDP per Capita fosters an increase in the GDP Growth Rate by the magnitude of
the parameter estimate in Brazil; there appears to be an inverse relationship between GDP per
Capita and growth in Russia, China and South Africa. The negative parameter estimates for these
countries would suggest that a 1% increase in GDP per Capita would result in a decrease of the
countries’ GDP Growth Rates by the magnitude of their respective parameter estimates.
As per the results, Inflation is only significant in Russia with a significance level of 5%.
The parameter estimate for Inflation is negative suggesting an inverse relationship to growth.
This negative correlation was initially expected. As such, a 10% increase in Inflation would lead
to a 0.162% decrease in Russia’s GDP Growth Rate.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is significant in China and South Africa both at 5%
significance levels. However, whilst the parameter estimate for FDI is positive in China, it
proves to be negative in South Africa. This would suggest that whilst increases in FDI in China
would help increase their GDP Growth Rate, the opposite is true for South Africa, increases in
the amount of FDI would lead to a decrease in South Africa’s GDP Growth Rate.
Similarly, Age Dependency Ratio also proved to be significant in only two countries,
Brazil and South Africa at the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The parameter
estimates for both countries are, as expected, negative. This means that a 10% increase in the
Age Dependency Ratio of these countries would lead to a 10.270% and 0.364% decrease in the
GDP Growth Rates of Brazil and South Africa, respectively. It is interesting to note the large
discrepancy in the magnitude of this parameter estimate by the country.

According to the results, Government Consumption is significant in four countries; Brazil
at the 5% significance level, Russia at the 10% significance level, India at the 10% significance
level and South Africa at the 1% significance level. The parameter estimates for this variable is
positive in all countries except Brazil. This suggests that whilst increases in Government
Consumption may lead to reduced GDP Growth Rates in Brazil, increases in this variable would
lead to increased GDP Growth Rates of Russia, India and China.
Finally, Table 2.0 also presents the parameter estimates and significance levels for the
independent variable of interest, Control of Corruption (CoC). As per the results presented,
Control of Corruption is only significant in Brazil and Russia both at the 10% significance level.
However, it must be noted that whilst the parameter estimate for CoC is negative in Brazil,
showing an inverse relationship to growth, it is positive in Russia, suggesting a positive
correlation to growth. As such, it would follow that a 10% increase in the levels of CoC in Brazil
and Russia would lead to a 0.716% decrease in the GDP Growth Rate of Brazil but a 0.308%
increase in the GDP Growth Rate of Russia.

6.0 CONCLUSION
Section 5.0’s empirical results show that GDP per Capita and Government Consumption
appear to be more relevant factors contributing to the growth, compared to the other variables.
This is given that both variables are significant in four of the five states. It must be noted that the
parameter estimates for each country carry different signs, thus suggesting that the relationship
between growth and GDP per Capita as well as growth and Government Consumption depends on
the country. From Section 5.0’s analysis, it can also be seen that inflation appears to be the least
relevant factor contributing to growth rate given it is only significant in one state, Russia.
The regression analysis shows that Control of Corruption is significant in Brazil and Russia
at the 10% level. It is, however, interesting to note that while the parameter estimate for Control
of Corruption in Brazil is negative (suggesting that there is an inverse relationship between

changes in corruption levels and economic growth in Brazil), the same estimate is positive in
Russia (suggesting an positive correlation between the corruption levels and growth). The results
given by the regression analysis appear to be consistent with Ahmad et al. (2012) and (Ebben and
de Vaal, 2009). Both studies conclude that certain types and levels of corruption can be conducive
to growth. This could be the explanation for the differing signs in the parameter estimates for
Brazil and Russia. Whilst the level, or type, of corruption experienced in Russia is growthenhancing; the level, or type, of corruption experienced in Brazil hinders the country’s economic
growth.
As such, Russia could choose to take advantage of their growth-enhancing corruption, so
long as they remain weary not to surpass the threshold after which corruption will begin to hinder
their growth. However, this is not advisable given public perception and grave negative views of
corruption. Also, given that many studies, some presented in the Literature Review section, have
shown that corruption in a country can have numerous negative effects on a country and its
economy; for instance, it can hinder the flow of investment and aid as well as reduce participation
rates. All this, will only harm the country and so, Russia would have to weigh the costs and benefits
of using their growth-enhancing corruption to help elevate their GDP Growth.
The topic of corruption and growth is an interesting one and future studies may choose to
take into consideration the type of corruption, not just the level of corruption. This is because not
all types of corruption are the same and different countries may experience different syndromes of
corruption. This may give more insight into the relationship between corruption and growth in
developing and transitional states.
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